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nor is there a reference anywhere to the amendment of § 74(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1933, which was held to provide for proof of damages for loss
of future rent in compositions. Therefore, it is not surprising to find no reference to the Bankruptcy statute, as codified in June I938, 4 by which such damages for not more than the rent for one year from surrender or reentry are
provable, from which it follows that the tenant's obligation is discharged.
Other errors and inconsistencies could easily be pointed out to lengthen this
review but perhaps enough has been said to support the disapproval of the
book. There is an appendix of forms some of which are taken from authoritative sources and may be helpful.
SAMUEL WILLISTON.*

By Lester Bernhardt Orfield.1
Little, Brown & Co. 1939. Pp. 321. $5.00.

CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMEmRCA.

Boston:

A book appearing as one of the new Judicial Administration Series of the
National Conference of Judicial Councils and in addition carrying the honor
of an introduction by Dean Roscoe Pound will awaken high hopes and expectations in the reader. It is no small praise, then, to say that Mr. Orfield richly
fulfills such hopes and expectations. He has produced a full, carefully prepared and lucid treatment of his subject, looked at from every angle and approach. As Dean Pound says, the path toward improvement in our appellate
system is made signally clearer and hence easier by this book.
I It opens by setting the stage by means of a lucid description of the history
of appellate review in England. This is followed by a number of chapters all
concerned with the extent to which review today is desirable. Thus there is
an excellent canvassing of the arguments, pro and con, regarding the entire
abolishing of all possible review, followed by a similar treatment of the opposite extreme, universal, automatic review. Noteworthy in this part of the
book is the chapter on the Scope of Appeal, particularly as to review of questions of fact. The factors involved are carefully analyzed and the desirable
points, or more accurately the undesirable points, of any possible solution are
equally carefully set forth. A less thorny subject, just as well handled, is that
of the scope of the reviewing court's authority to modify judgments and sentences. Finally, among these chapters on policy problems, that on the greatly
neglected subject of Petty Criminal Appeals should not be overlooked. There
is an ocean of talk about the importance of the first offender. There is also
usually a complete lack of interest in the area where he is most likely to be
found - the petty offense. Just as parole reformers are generally too busy
with felons to concern themselves with the much more promising material in
the jails, so it is too easy to forget that there is a very serious appeal problem
in every petty offense. Fortunately Mr. Orfield has not forgotten.
From these problems of broad policy the author turns to the reviewing
machinery as it is actually set up and working in this country. The resultant
4 52 STAT. 873, I U. S. C. § io3a (Supp. 1938).
*"Dane Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School.

1 Professor of Law, University of Nebraska Law School.
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survey inevitably is much less interesting in nature than are the pages given
to policy. It brings out, however, the presence of numerous defects which
individually should be easy of correction but which nonetheless survive generation after generation. High among them in importance is that hardy perennial, delay. Thus, says Mr. Orfield, 2 the law grants the defendant, in some
states, as long as two years in which to seek review by writ of error. 3 Truly
this is altogether too long a period in which the matter is kept in abeyance.
To some extent, however, delay is inevitable if we wish to have severe sentences. Whatever may be possible theoretically, delay is, and always will be,
part of the purchase price of severity, just as reduced certainty of punishment
is also part of the purchase price. Of course delay is vicious. But procedural
changes will not entirely cure it. If we really wish to reduce it we must curb
the prevailing American practice which makes our scale of punishments the
most severe of any country in the civilized world. One means of reducing delay which Mr. Orfield apparently favors is to have the reviewing court sit in
divisions and thereby increase its output (p. 133). But the rather obvious
objections to such a procedure are scarcely touched on.
A similar concentration of emphasis on one side of the argument characterizes the treatment of the highly controversial subject of review in behalf of
the state. Mr. Orfield is strongly opposed to any such review and urges the
resultant "harassing" of the defendant, while at almost the same time he
claims the needlessness of providing for it as shown by the very few cases in
which, in states where it is permitted, the state avails itself of the privilege.
The arguments for such review seem to be somewhat cavalierly treated. But
perhaps the reviewer is merely revealing his own bias.
Occasionally sweeping statements are made that cover a little too much
ground 4 or are only partially valid. 5 Occasionally, too, inconsistencies creep
in, or at least positions that seem hard to harmonize; for instance, the implication 6 that it would be desirable entirely to abolish briefs, as in England,
and the statement 7 that briefs can be of great service to the reviewing court.
There are very few such inconsistencies, however -indeed surprisingly few
in view of the fact that most of the chapters of the book originally appeared
as separate law review articles, revised and brought down to date.
2 P. 124.
3 Citizens of Illinois will look wistfully at even a two year limit. In People v.
Sprague, 371 Ill. 627, 21 N. E.(2d) 763 (1939), decided less than a year ago, the
delay amounted to a mere eleven years.
4 E.g., the statement on page 35 that motions for a new trial should be abolished.
Granted that they are abused and that weak courts yield to the abuse, is the remedy
so drastic a pouring out of the baby with the bath? Surely they frequently can
and do serve a useful purpose. Or the statement (on page 21) that the court at
common law had the power to suspend indefinitely the imposition or execution of
sentence.
5 Thus in discussing the fixing of sentences and their review by the appellate
court he argues convincingly of the inadequate job likely to be done by both upper
and lower court, and concludes (p. 120) that this function should better be intrusted
to a specially created "disposition tribunal." True- so far as it goes. But what
of the device of indeterminate sentence, whereby no one, trial judge, appellate court,
or extra-judicial tribunal, is given the nearly impossible task of setting a fixed sentence based on an impossible foreknowing of what the prisoner is going to be in
the future?

6 P. 129.
7 P. 159.
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This origin of much of the book in law review articles is sometimes rather
evident. For instance some chapters have black letter paragraph headings;
others do not. Likewise there is a tendency, now and then, to go over the
same ground and repeat. For instance, the beginning of Chapter IV goes
rapidly over the same subjects dealt with in Chapter I. A more marked instance of such repetition appears in the concluding chapters on Federal
Appeals and the American Law Institute Code respectively which are taken
up without even cross-references to the earlier and fuller general treatment of
the successive stages in the appeal process. It is at least possible that it would
have been more desirable to print the Code (and perhaps also the federal
rules) in an appendix, with footnote references to the place of text discussion.
The space saved by avoidance of duplication would have been more than
ample for such an appendix.8
Actual errors of statement are, so far as the reviewer has been able to ascertain, few and inconsequential. The list of states in which the state has no
appeal whatsoever 9 should no longer include Illinois.' ° Similarly that state
should not be listed among those using commissioners. 1 Mere misprints and
textual errors are likewise extremely rare. In fact Mr. Orfield has dealt very
harshly with the reviewers, who are, of course, expected to show their assiduity
by turning up a series of such inconsequential errors - he has left almost
none to give them comfort. 12
Returning to more substantial matters, the author deserves special praise
for the remarkable thoroughness with which he has run to earth every article,
speech or other source of material for his subject. None seems to have been
too brief or too far afield to gain his notice. And no aspect of his subject
has appeared to him too slight to get this same painstaking care. 13 There is
no slipshod let-down where the author's interest wanes.
In summary, the faults of the book are few and of no great consequence.
Its merits are numerous and substantial. It should richly justify the useful
future which Dean Pound prophesies for it.
E.

V.

PUTTKAMMER.*

8 Occasionally this duplication is not confined to the repetition of the same idea,
but goes so far as to involve repetition of identical passages. For example, pages
173 and 272 have identical passages, and pages ioo and 274 ones nearly so. Footnote
53 on page i95 is largely repeated, word for word in footnote 92 on page 277. At
least one statement actually appears three times, on pages 172, 257 and 272. Obviously these not very important slips are due to the separate appearance of the chapters in different law reviews. Editing, with such care as the book deserves, would
have eliminated them.
9 As given in the footnote on page 55.
10 See ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1939) c. 38, § 747.
11 Commissioners are still used in disbarment proceedings. They were discontinued for all other purposes in 1929, although, curiously enough, the names of the
former holders of the office appeared on the title pages of the official reports for
another four years.
12 The present reviewer hastens to demonstrate his own assiduity by the following exhibits: On page 37, in footnote 20, line r, the meaning is distorted by the
omission of "not." On page 278 in one place the word "reversal" has crept in
where it should be " change of venue." On page i9o, in footnote 34, State v. Adkins
is cited as State v. Atkinson. The most satisfying discovery was that "review" is
spelled "reveiw" on page 296. No doubt this will be quite sufficient.
13 An excellent example is the detailed analysis of the arguments for typewritten
appeal papers as against printed ones.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

